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Abstract 
In this close reading of Seneca’s consolation to his mother, I propose new ways of 
understanding the text as a whole, building critically on responses to Fantham’s thesis of 
‘displacement’ (Fantham 2007), and mapping how the notoriously violent opening relates to 
the central body of the text, and to its concluding chapters. The paper focuses on Seneca’s 
metaphors of the wound and wounding, and on what kinds of ethical relation might be 
imagined and sustained by the counter-intuitive process of irritating, revisiting and sharing in 
psychophysical wounds rather than closing them. In considering the disruption to 
invulnerable male identity that the wounded mother may be seen to represent in this text, I 
reassess the significance of the ad Heluiam in the development of Stoic ethics and explore 
what is missing in Foucault’s tendentious account of imperial Stoicism as a quasi-medical 
regimen and social practice in which ‘all is lost if you begin with care for others’ (Foucault 
2005, 198).  
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The intimacy of wounds: care of the other in Seneca’s Consolatio ad Heluiam 
 
The aim of this paper is to put into practice new ways of reading the Consolatio ad Heluiam 
matrem, which was written at some point during Seneca’s relegation to Corsica (c.42-29 CE), 
and is the only surviving Latin text in which an author addresses his own mother.i My point 
of departure takes the form of a basic question to which many scholars have already 
responded, in different ways: that is, does the ad Heluiam console (the mother, Seneca’s 
readers), and if so, how?  I will suggest that the text’s power to console consists in its 
performative affirmation of interconnectedness, or of ethical relation, through an ambivalent 
acknowledgement of shared psychophysical vulnerability. While it is undoubtedly the case 
that this consolation functions as a philosophical and socio-political document within a web 
of consolatory texts that includes Letters 63 and 99, the ad Marciam and the ad Polybium, it 
also represents a unique experiment in approaching female grief, one that must do violence to 
the sovereign subject held up as the Roman and Stoic ideal, even in this very text.ii Thus far, 
critics have tended to read the ad Heluiam either as a shoring up of Stoic masculine 
impermeability through the othered (wounded, violated) body of the mother, or as an 
enactment of Stoic ideas about community through the performance of intimacy with the 
mother within a network of kinship ties. I will start (in section I) by reviewing these 
approaches in detail and discussing the problems associated with both sets of readings: the 
former, I will argue, reduces the violence of the ad Heluiam to masculinist appropriation (an 
argument which flattens out some of the text’s most interesting aspects), while the latter, 
more generalising reading elides violence completely and does not attend to the text’s 
meaningful playfulness, its poetics, or what Wilson calls Seneca’s ‘passionate discourses’ of 
the passions (Wilson 1997, 59). My approach is not quite a third way. I am interested in the 
text’s performance of violence, in particular its use of wounds as symbolic sites of opening 
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towards the (m)other, and the presentation of consolation as a counter-intuitive re-opening or 
irritation of wounds in the first chapters. I suggest that this substantial frame (chs.1-4 of 20), 
which gestures towards a complex weave of discourses to do with ‘virtuous’ or ‘shameful’ 
wounding and with the dynamic, gendered, medicalised body in imperial Roman thought, is 
not just a prelude to a reassertion of rational control performed in the centre of the 
consolation (5-13), but also a lingering provocation, and a lens through which we are invited 
to read the consolatory entanglements laid out in chs.14-20. Paradigmatically, the ad Heluiam 
dwells on what Nussbaum in The Therapy of Desire calls ‘the spectacle of violation’ – that is, 
the need to expose ‘the core of [the] self to the possibility of invasion’ if one is to live ‘a 
passionate life’ – in such a way that it is not necessarily ‘repellent’, but rather a condition of 
possibility for relationhood and for consolation itself.iii   
What Seneca does, I will argue in sections II-IV, in a text which I insist is doing 
significant philosophical work, is to enact the ontological implications of this engagement 
with the mother as a conflict, one that flirts with but is not reducible to tragi-epic drama (with 
an eye on the politically disruptive work of mourning mobilised in tragedy in particular). In 
broad terms, building on work by critics like Henderson, Gunderson, Ker and Dressler, I am 
focused here on what kinds of thinking and experience are possible when we are attuned to 
Seneca’s texts as dramatic sites of debate and affectively charged poetic dimensions in which 
what is being mapped philosophically, in ways that demand our participation, is an open-
ended struggle rather than a done deal.iv The literal content of Seneca’s texts is inseparable 
from (the challenge of interpreting) the precise shape, texture and framing of that content, and 
there is more to this than what Inwood helpfully outlines as the ‘protreptic value’ of Seneca’s 
‘two-level mode of discourse’, whereby audiences are invited to reflect on the gap between 
paradoxical theory and social reality, or between philosophical ideal and social convention.v 
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Specifically, I want to consider the challenge to the fortress of Stoic male identity that the 
maternal may be seen to represent in this text, and the extent to which Seneca’s dramatized 
inseparability from his mother (or what Parker 2012 would diagnose as his ‘mother trouble’) 
operates as a framework for thinking through dependency, time, loss, and ethical 
responsibility in the context of Seneca’s exile and in the precarious climate of mid-first-
century Rome. I will be exploring the extent to which the text exploits what Wilson calls the 
‘self-disturbing act’ of consolation  to suggest, in flashes, a way of living with grief that on 
one hand is a comforting reminder of our constitutive sociality, and on the other becomes a 
challenging mode of political resistance that reorients us towards non-dogmatic identities.vi  
Two larger points, I hope, will emerge from this reading. First, it will enable us to 
envisage how the political, philosophical and personal functions of this text (and their appeal 
to multiple audiences) might intersect, or indeed become inseparable. Secondly, it will 
reassess the significance of the ad Heluiam in the development of Stoic ethics and of Roman 
engagement with classical medicine in this period, not least because this consolation presents 
a radical challenge to Foucault’s and Hadot’s paradigmatic emphasis on the cultivation of the 
self in Hellenistic ethics as centred on a medicalised regulation and mastery of the desiring 
body, whereby the male philosopher is aligned with the detached, dispassionate physician of 
the Hippocratic tradition.vii The Foucaultian paradigm dictates that techniques of self-control 
and self-containment may have a positive outcome for the community, but that caring for 
others is secondary, almost a side effect, rather than an ethical imperative in itself. As 
Foucault puts it in Hermeneutics of the Subject, ‘care of the self…must produce or induce 
behaviour through which one will actually be able to take care of others. But all is lost if you 
begin with care of others’ (198).  The ad Heluiam, I suggest, troubles this picture, and reveals 
the extent to which Seneca grapples not only with the impossibility of the ideal underpinning 
Hellenistic philosophy’s ‘care of the self – the self-sufficient, impermeable free male subject 
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– but also with the productive potential of this (struggle with) loss or ‘failure’.viii  I take up 
Brooke Holmes’ corrective that the body Foucault takes as a given in classical antiquity is in 
fact an ‘emergent phenomenon’ and a ‘philosophical problem’.ix We are witness to this 
emergent body in the ad Heluiam when we see Seneca playing both heroic, articulate 
physician and humbled, stuttering patient, both healthy, objectifying expert and a suffering 
subject prone to illness whose empathic account of psychophysical wounds shakes up the 
dualisms of Foucault’s model. While critics have long recognised the importance of process, 
practice and fallibility in Senecan Stoicism (Seneca presents himself as a proficiens, a 
‘learner’, and admits his flaws), Seneca’s place in a history of ideas significantly coloured by 
Foucault has meant that we continue to privilege the drive towards self-mastery in Senecan 
thought and to suppress the challenge of a vulnerable relational self that comes to the fore in 
the consolatory mode especially. The emergent body in this text, configured through the 
maternal, is  – to echo Kristeva - a subject-in-process, or a subject on trial.x Through the 
figure of the wound, a tear through which the ad Heluiam converses with medicine from the 
Hippocratics to Celsus, with Greco-Roman epic, tragedy and erotic elegy, and also with a 
broader imaginary of the heroic or demeaning display of wounds and scars in Roman 
thought,  the self-regulating, disembodied subject of Foucaultian consolation becomes porous 
to the temporality of maternal grief and to the vulnerability encoded in the penetrable adult 
female body.xi This paper considers how disruptive, limiting, therapeutic or generative such 
an opening might be.  
 
I. contrariis curari: approaches to the ad Heluiam 
The ad Heluiam is an uneven, multifaceted text.xii It begins as a juddering, emotionally 
intense address to Helvia on the challenges, timing and visceral violence of this consolation, 
drifts into increasingly impersonal argumentation (including bits of dialogue with an 
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anonymous male interlocutor), in which the author claims that the exiled Stoic does not 
suffer, and turns back in its final, third act (chs. 14-20) to Helvia’s subjective experience of 
grief and to how she might find comfort in close family relationships, in which Seneca 
himself is also imbricated. This inconsistency and polyphony have spurred very different 
definitions of and approaches to the text. The ad Heluiam has been read as philosophical or 
anti-philosophical,xiii personal (directed at Helvia) or political (intended for the emperor and 
his circle),xiv as a ‘novel disquisition’ on exile,xv a genuine attempt at consoling Helvia,xvi a 
self-consolation whose real aim is to demonstrate virtue in extirpating passions,xvii a defence 
against adultery (the purported crime for which Seneca is exiled) in which the philosopher 
attaches himself to his mother’s exemplary pudicitia,xviii an ‘oblique commentary on the 
nature and limits of Roman imperial power and self-regard in Seneca’s age’,xix or as a text 
which envisages the Hellenistic cultivation of the self as a ‘true social practice’,xx moving 
outward from the private sphere to the political and cosmic.xxi  
Yet while critics are attuned to the ‘peculiar tension[s]’xxii of the ad Heluiam and to its 
jagged transitions, many seem disinterested in what is at stake, philosophically, in Seneca 
addressing a consolation to his mother in the first place, in the context both of his central 
concern with female experience of grief in the tragedies (e.g. Hecuba and the Trojan women, 
Medea, Clytemnestra) and of a broader and much debated Stoic interest in women’s equal 
rational capacities and place in the world.xxiii Even scholars who, more recently, have turned 
directly to the question of the mother in the ad Heluiam seem motivated to occlude or gloss 
over the weird intimacy of Seneca’s mode of engagement with Helvia, especially in the 
disjunctive opening chapters, where he imagines having staunched his own wound with his 
hand as he crawled towards his mother, and compares himself to a man trying to lift his head 
from his own funeral pyre, before announcing his plan to ‘expose and re-open all the wounds 
which have already healed’ (omnia proferam et rescindam quae iam obducta sunt, 2.2).xxiv In 
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the wake of Foucault, who cites the ad Heluiam in his Care of the Self as documenting an 
‘intensification of social relations’ in the first century (1986, 52-3), and after Fantham’s 
landmark 2007 article on the ad Heluiam and ad Polybium as ‘texts of displacement’, the 
mother and the maternal in the ad Heluiam are seen as rhetorical ploys in a self-serving 
strategy of specular reversal and substitution. As a result, the mutual woundedness and 
layered medical-philosophical perspectives of the text’s opening paragraphs (echoed and 
transformed through chs.15-20) simply fade from view.xxv Read against Foucault’s template, 
this is a public, political document that performs virtuous male self-fashioning before an 
audience which, as it were, looks over the mother’s shoulder. The victim of relegation, as 
Fantham outlines, becomes the triumphant consoler of his mother back in Rome, and the 
mother’s grief takes the place of the philosopher’s own suffering, which he can now 
transcend: in short, her penetrable, wounded body allows for his exemplary, bodiless self-
regulation.xxvi For McAuley, this is an ultimately narcissistic exercise in which Helvia is 
reduced to a textual mirror. Seneca needs to conquer his mother’s womanly grief (uincere 
dolorem, 4.1) as it is shameful to him and threatens to taint his own self-image. In doing so 
he performs his own heroic resilience, underscoring at the same time the political inefficacy 
of his punishment. Paradigmatically, Seneca’s promise to re-open the mother’s uulnera, 
McAuley suggests, stages a ‘textual rape’, by which he asserts proper paternalistic control 
over the body that birthed him (2016, 181). Gunderson’s parallel reading (2015, 88-104), 
which draws on Irigaray’s Speculum, envisions Seneca’s treatment of his mother as a 
symbolic matricide in which Helvia’s exceptionality is contingent on the erasure of her 
subjectivity and on her representation as an honorary man.xxvii Wilson, too, stresses that the 
point of what is ultimately an exulceratio (an irritation that produces painful rawness, 1.2) is 
on one hand, and in dialogue with Senecan tragedy, to explore inconsolability, and on the 
other to act out a phallic, self-aggrandising battle with grief in which what is significant is not 
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the end but the struggle itself. As he puts it ‘it is more important to contend with grief than to 
be free of it’ (Wilson 2013, 110). But whether or not, or in what way, that wrestling with (the 
mother’s) grief might be a transformative process or philosophical spur remains a mute 
question, and the philosopher’s successful self-reliance – after Foucault - is a given.  
Little real dialogue has emerged between these literary-critical readings and other 
approaches more focused on philosophical content, for example those of Gloyn and 
Reydams-Schils, who want to see the consolation as affirmative and constructive within a 
recognisably Stoic framework for understanding relationships and community, and therefore 
make sense of the mother in the ad Heluiam as a figure for relationality, or as the 
reproductive epicentre in Hierocles’ image of concentric circles of care.xxviii Gloyn in 
particular discusses the extent to which Seneca consoles Helvia in chs.14-20 by the 
‘practical’ strategy of emphasizing her embeddedness in a supportive network of kinship ties: 
Helvia is not just a mother but a grandmother, sister, daughter, niece, etc., and her relatives 
are entwined in multiple, active and passive ways with both her and Seneca himself.xxix Yet 
Gloyn (much less Reydams-Schils) is not interested in the poetics of the ad Heluiam and her 
discussion is limited to explaining how the text is therapeutic in the literal content of what it 
says to Helvia, in so far as that content relates to Stoic oikeiōsis. The perverse violence of the 
text is elided, and we are made to forget that this is not, straightforwardly, a heart-warming 
confirmation of the webs of familial care, but rather, I would suggest, a performative 
excavation of the vulnerability, figured by the mother and the maternal body, that is the 
condition of those relationships of dependency and ethical responsibility.xxx 
In Gloyn and Reydams-Schils, we find no engagement with those critics who insist 
that for Seneca the literary or the figurative is a mode that affords the staging and teaching of 
philosophical ideas in idiosyncratic, and even shocking or counter-cultural ways.  For 
Reydams-Schils, in particular, after Inwood and others, the literary gets in the way of the 
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philosophical, and is a distraction to filter out:xxxi she suggests a hierarchical opposition 
between literature and philosophy which mirrors the one often assumed to be operative 
between the intimate/maternal/bodily on the one hand and the philosophical on the other in 
the ad Heluiam (2005, passim).  Meanwhile, McAuley (2016, 169-200) and Williams (2006, 
168-70) see the consolation’s playful sociality as an ‘aspect’ which operates alongside the 
core lecture on  masculine, Stoic self-sufficiency and alongside the splitting or repudiation 
involved in a dynamic of displacement. For these critics, then, the performative weaving of 
relationality in the ad Heluiam is subsequent to and entirely compatible with individual 
sovereignty (and thus with a modern liberal individualist model of selfhood, uncritically 
assumed). Yet this reading must obviate the bristling fleshiness of Seneca’s text, the 
philosophical friction it reveals and exploits, and necessarily involves appropriating the 
mother as same in order to maintain the fiction of Seneca’s non-dependency. It is assumed, 
after Freud and Lacan, that the adult psyche must be forged out of an aggressive separation 
(or to echo Fantham, displacement) from the mother, despite the fact that in the ad Heluiam 
Seneca overtly does not perform what Irigaray (or theorists of an ethics of care such as 
Gilligan, Kittay and Held) would call a disavowal of maternal origin, and of what it 
represents – male vulnerability and dependency, or the lie of dematerialised self-mastery.xxxii  
In using the figure of wounding to frame his consolation, I will argue, Seneca doesn’t 
simply repeat a sensationalising tragi-epic topos about the performance of masculine, military 
uirtus, as Salazar proposes (2000, 223). Instead, he engages in provocative, critical ways with 
the wound as figurative gap between putative Stoic ideal and (potential) lived reality, a reality 
in which the process of cultivating the ethical subject by securing the real and symbolic body 
against penetrability is open-ended, unstable, or even bound to fail.xxxiii The ad Heluiam 
represents Seneca’s most developed and provocative exploration of a trope that plays a key 
role throughout his prose works.xxxiv Crucially here, permeability is not simply projected onto 
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the maternal exemplum: instead, it seeps out between the lines of Seneca’s disjointed, ‘sand-
without-lime’ prose (Suetonius, Cal.53), and into the paradox of the very project of Senecan 
consolation, which promises to heal the wound (liberalia studia … sanabunt uulnus, 17.3) by 
entering into the porous mind-body (in animum tuum intrauerint, 17.5; altius praecepta 
descendunt, 18.8, cf. ex omnibus quae umquam in corpus tuum descenderunt recens uulnus, 
3.1). At the same time, the persistent focus on how to treat wounds in medical texts (from the 
Hippocratic works on head wounds, ulcers and fistulae to Celsus’ discussion of wounds in de 
medicina V and VI) might be seen to inform Seneca’s play on the pharmacological 
doubleness of wounds and on the parallels between consolation and medicine as artes 
temporis (as he writes in ad Helu.1.2, ‘nothing is more dangerous than untimely medicine, 
inmatura medicina).xxxv While Celsus, for example, reminds us that in the case of surgery 
‘the doctor makes the wound rather than finds it’ (uulnus facit medicus, non accipit, 7.1.5), 
Seneca – after Cicero - adapts medical-philosophical debates on whether and when wounds 
should themselves be further opened or ‘excised’ to his contrarian philosophical practice 
(plerumque contrariis curari, 2.2), while getting us to think about how consolation responds 
to debates on tragic/medical catharsis as ‘purgation’, menstruation, or as the cleaning out of 
wounds (corpora exsaniari, ad Helu. 3.1).xxxvi  The ad Heluiam makes bodily rupture the 
icon for an opening to the other, and for a counter-cultural temporality in which mourning is 
potentially incessant, or circular, rather than strictly delimited by the powers that be in linear 
time.xxxvii   
To expand, therefore, on my introductory remarks, this discussion will also gesture 
towards the limits of Foucault’s thesis, best represented in The Care of the Self, according to 
which imperial philosophy, rhetoric and medicine tell a homologous story about bodily and 
psychic regulation, a story that we can implicitly dissect from the messier, literary 
immersions in vulnerability that we may admit finding in tragedy or erotic elegy.xxxviii On the 
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contrary, I suggest, the ad Heluiam points towards many tensions and contrasts (as well as 
overlaps) between medical, literary, rhetorical and philosophical discourses in first-century 
Rome, and enacts for us what is distinctive about the hybridic space Senecan dialogue creates 
for the phenomenological experience of woundedness. 
 
II. Mutual vulnerability: ad Helv.1 
Let us immerse ourselves, then, in the opening chapters, where Seneca first offers a meta-
discourse on (this) consolation, which is presented as emerging from a period of anxious self-
questioning. The scene in ch.1 is an excited, exciting one of mutual woundedness, intensified 
by military metaphors and a high, tragi-epic poetics of excess, with touches of the elegiac. It 
is difficult to follow, and its affective exuberance and revelation of vulnerability are striking, 
even when set against Seneca’s identification with the flawed, ‘sick’ proficiens elsewhere. 
Consider the first two sentences:  
 
Saepe iam, mater optima, impetum cepi consolandi te, saepe continui. Vt auderem multa 
me inpellebant.  
  ad Heluiam 1.1 
 
Dearest mother, I have often felt the urge to console you and often restrained it. Many 
things were pushing me to dare to do it.xxxix 
 
Seneca describes the impulse he has often felt to console his mother as an impetus, which 
previously he managed to contain, and to which he now, implicitly, yields. The agency or 
control implied in the first person cepi (I had, I took) is followed by a passive position: many 
things ‘pushed me’, me inpellebant. The verb inpello echoes the loaded noun impetus, which 
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like its Greek equivalent hormē, is conventionally opposed to logos/ ratio in Stoic thought 
and is a keyword in Stoic theory of the passions (e.g. Cicero, Off. 1.101; 2.18).xl This is the 
term used for irrational instinct and dangerous erotic desire in Ovid Remedia 10 (et, quod 
nunc ratio, impetus ante fuit). It is shorthand for the wave of grief in Seneca’s Phoenissae 
(mitte uiolentum impetum / doloris, 347-8), encoding tragedy’s investment in unrestrained 
mourning (e.g. effuso fletu, in Troades, 410-11); and it is used to describe the ‘attack’ of a 
disease at its most acute stage in medical texts (e.g. in ipso acuti morbi impetus, Celsus 
2.4.11).xli Seneca’s position here is more akin to that of the patient rather than the expert 
doctor, a move familiar to readers of his Letters. At Ep. 78.2, for example, the phrase 
impetum cepi describes Seneca’s longing to end his life when in the midst of chronic 
catarrhal seizures (saepe impetum cepi abrumpendae uitae; cf. Ep. 70.12, Suet. Otho 9.3), 
which he only curtailed by reflecting on how his father would not be able to bear the pain 
(78.2). Most crucially, impetus connects Seneca’s emotional distress with Helvia’s, in this 
text’s wounded frame (et ipsa quiete impetum ad saeuiendum colligit, 17.2).  
Seneca then reflects on how he considered various possibilities and outcomes, 
alternating imperfect tenses which indicate an ongoing period of struggle (inpellebant … non 
dubitabam … timebam … conabar … sciebam … expectabam, etc.) with future participles 
(depositurus… habiturum…occurendum) and a string of (unfulfilled?) conditions (si 
supprimere non potuissem, interim certe abstersissem … si prior ipse consurrexissem). These 
shifts in perspective and uncertain projections towards the future leave ambiguous the extent 
to which he really has (in the meantime) ‘risen up’, whether Helvia’s grief really has ‘lost its 
force’ by now, and whether what he says he was thinking of doing in the period before 
penning this consolatio is the same thing he is intending to do, or already actually doing, 
here. In this way, Seneca allows us to enter into an indeterminate process of grief leading up 
to the making of this text in which he and his mother are emotionally inter-dependent 
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(consoling her is a means of making himself feel less troubled, yet his power to console is 
also predicated, perhaps, on healing himself first), and into a temporality in which many 
emotions and possible futures are being experienced simultaneously or in close succession. 
Grief itself is parsed as a kind of waiting or atypical experience of time: things delayed him 
and held him back (rursus … retardarent, 1.2); the long-lasting recent-ness of grief is 
agonising (dum recens saeuiret, 1.2); he was waiting for the right time (expectabam) and for 
delay to have a mitigating effect ([sc. dolor] mora mitigatus, 1.2).xlii Crucially, the son’s pain 
is conceived as inseparable from that of the mother: Seneca recalls previous attempts to 
staunch his own cut while crawling, animal-like, or infant-like, towards Helvia to bind her 
wounds (itaque utcumque conabar manu super plagam meam inposita ad obliganda uulnera 
uestra reptare, 1.1), although conabar (‘I was trying’/’I used to try’) does not confirm he 
managed this, or to what extent he is still making this attempt now.   
The first paragraph of the text appears to strive towards proper masculine rectitude (si 
… consurrexissem, 1.1) and towards the subject position of the dispassionate doctor: thus 
Seneca alludes to ancient medical discussion of timing in treating disease (nihil est 
perniciosus quam inmatura medicina, 1.2) and refers to applying remedia and to touching 
and handling a patient in pain (tangi se ac tractari pateretur, 1.2). Yet this struggle is, 
overtly, incomplete, marred not only by regression to primitive/infantile crawling (reptare, 
1.1), in the manner of Philoctetes with his agonising, incurable wound (cf. Sophocles, 
Phil.205-7),xliii but also by fear and uncertainty (timebam, 1.1; haesitabam uerebarque, 1.2). 
Imperfect tenses (expectabam) make us linger on the possibility or hope that Helvia’s grief 
will have softened. Seneca also affirms that grief is stubborn (contumax, 1.4) and stops short 
of stating that in the ‘meantime’ of grief (praeterea), his own cut or blow (plaga) has healed. 
And while we may read remedia in 1.2 as a medical-philosophical term (it is used elsewhere 
by Seneca in reference to consolationxliv), the juxtaposition with mora (ad sustinenda remedia 
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mora) is also highly evocative of Ovid’s Remedia Amoris, which draws extensively on 
consolatory literature and follows the sequence of consolation outlined in Cicero Tusc. 
4.35.xlv  Like Ovid, who in the Remedia regularly compares the suffering male lover to a 
mother who has lost a son, and promises to wait until his/her spirit is ‘treatable’ (tractabilis, 
123) and her wounds ready to be touched (uulnera tangi, 125), Seneca will wait for his own 
mother to allow him to touch and handle her pain (tangi se ac tractari pateretur, 1.2).xlvi  Yet 
Ovid also emphasizes, notoriously, the role of mora in producing (its anagram) amor and in 
perpetuating rather than mitigating suffering. In Rem. 95, as scholars have discussed, Ovid 
showcases this idea by getting us to visualise and hear the re-production or circulation of 
amor through delay in the phrase amor reperitque alimenta morando,xlvii a ploy we may hear 
echoed now in Seneca’s ad sustinenda remedia mora mitigatus. Seneca’s subtle engagement 
with the Remedia Amoris, a text which in continually catalysing the rebirth of desire also 
risks re-wounding rather than consoling lovers, hints at a different kind of consolation 
invested precisely in reflecting on what may be experienced anew within the uncanny 
temporality of mourning.xlviii Grief is itself a kind of longing (desiderium, ad Helu. 1.4, cf. 
18.3), even an (erotic) pleasure-pain, a uoluptas (cf. Ep. 63.4-5, 99.25-9) or elegiac uulnus.xlix 
A backdrop of Ovidian commentary on medicalised-erotic mora (as both necessary to 
cure the lover’s suffering and a stimulus to amor) always already encompasses medical-
philosophical debates about how long to wait before treating wounds in ad Helu.1-4. In our 
surviving medical texts, the logical principle is almost always to treat physical wounds before 
they become inflamed and not to wait (see e.g. Celsus 7.7.4, Galen de methodo medendi 
5.368K,  cf. Ovid Rem. 101-2l), a principle to which Seneca refers at ad Marciam 1.8.li Yet 
the metaphor of the emotional as physical wound in non-medical works often involves acting 
after a delay. For example, as Cicero puts it in a passage evoked here, while laying claim to a 
(dubious) equivalence between medical and psychotherapeutic artes temporis, ‘timely 
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medicine’ should avoid rushing and thereby ‘aggravating a wound’ (non adgrauescens 
uulnus, Tusc. 3.76, cf. ne…ipsa solacia inritarent, ad Helu. 1.2), a line he offers as a loose 
translation of Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound 382.lii Virgil’s Turnus becomes a case-study for 
the principle that too early an intervention can worsen a wound at the beginning of Aeneid 12, 
when Latinus’ attempt to calm him down backfires, precisely because Turnus is (still) 
inflamed with anger (implacabilis ardet, Aen. 12.3), like a frenzied, wounded lion (saucius … 
uulnere pectus /… leo, Aen. 12.5-6). In what suggests itself as a proto-Ovidian play on words 
(nulla mora in Turno, Aen.12.11), Turnus is raging to meet Aeneas now, yet instead of 
waiting, Latinus confronts him immediately, with the result that Turnus ‘is inflamed by the 
healing’ (aegrescit medendo, 12.46). In his passion, he confuses wounding his enemy Aeneas 
with self-harm: et nostro sequitur de uulnere sanguis (‘and from me [sc.: ‘inflicted by me’], 
too, blood flows from a [his] wound’ 12.51).liii  I mention this not to insist that there is any 
specific verbal allusion to Aeneid 12 in ad Heluiam 1, but to highlight the density and 
complexity of Roman literary thinking about wounds on which Seneca is drawing here, and 
in which the bodily and the psychological, the scientific and the poetic are already closely 
intertwined. On one hand, Seneca’s mingling of elegiac, tragi-epic, philosophical and medical 
discourses has the effect of blurring the differences between psychological and physical 
wounds (grief physically hurts). On the other, this mingling points to significant tensions 
between the subjective experience of wounds as it can be explored in the imaginative domain 
of literary texts, and the clinical objectification of the patient’s body which must be treated 
quickly despite the agony this might cause, in medical works. 
Just as Seneca seems to be getting a grip on dolor and moving (therefore) to a place 
where he can envisage consoling his mother, referring authoritatively to the careful 
background research undertaken for this project (omnia clarissimorum ingeniorum 
monumenta … euoluerem, 1.2), he infers that he is like a man trying to lift his head from his 
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own funeral pyre to console his relatives (homini ad consolandos suos ex ipso rogo caput 
adleuanti). He seems to acknowledge that, as Derrida puts it, ‘one cannot hold a discourse on 
the “work of mourning” without taking part in it, without announcing or partaking [se faire 
part de] death, and first of all in one’s own death’ (2001, 142). As Abel observes – a point 
taken up but not developed by Degl’Innocenti Pierini – Seneca’s image is reminiscent of the 
famous scene in which dying Dido struggles to lift her head from the pyre after plunging 
Aeneas’ sword into her chest, at Virgil Aeneid 4.688-90 (illa, grauis oculos conata attollere, 
rursus / deficit; infixum stridit sub pectore uulnus. / ter sese attollens cubitoque adnexa 
leuauit).liv Earlier, Dido had spoken her last words (nouissima uerba, 4.650), and asked for 
the ultimate consolation, or release from care, in death (exsolvite curas, 4.652), whereas 
Seneca, on his ‘deathbed’, reflects on the need to find ‘new words’ (nouis uerbis), not 
‘ordinary ones’ (nec ex uulgari et cotidiana, 1.3), but the kind of uncommon diction used, 
perhaps, in epic and tragic poetry. We may decide to interpret this as the dispassionate, self-
reflexive play of a writer negotiating his authority within literary traditions, and note 
emphasis on a male figure (homini). In one sense, Seneca is no fallen queen. Yet the 
particular way the text puts this on display also turns male consolator into (female) victim, 
and allows the spectre of his wound (plaga, 1.1) to bleed through this vulnerable opening 
chapter in a way that blurs a distinction between self-inflicted wound and a wound caused by 
fate. For a brief moment, Seneca can play the man playing a heroic yet pitiful widow, and his 
mother’s uulnera can feel like his own (self-)harm, as he consoles himself in her.  
Whereas Seneca tries to speak, or to write a silent letter, Dido can only lift her eyes 
while her wound ‘hisses’ (stridit), as inhuman and uncanny a sound as Fama’s screech at the 
start of book four (stridens, Aen. 4.185). Yet as if to respond to the violent curtailing of 
Dido’s voice, Seneca then implies that his own excessive grief is stifling his ability to express 
himself at all: 
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Omnis autem magnitudo doloris modum excedentis necesse est dilectum uerborum 
eripiat, cum saepe uocem quoque ipsam intercludat. 
       ad Heluiam 1.3 
 
But every great and overpowering grief must take away the capacity to choose words 
since it often stifles the voice itself.lv  
 
This sentence registers Seneca’s own boundless dolor (the same word used of Helvia’s grief, 
which he shares: dolori tuo, 1.2; dolorem tuum, 2.1), and points towards its relative cultural 
unspeakability, for a man (homini, 1.3).lvi In a forceful double metaphor, grief is seen forcibly 
to snatch away, or murder (eripiat)lvii the process of choosing words that is implicitly 
Seneca’s in writing this text, or, if we think in military terms, the process of ‘recruiting’ 
words (dilectum).lviii It is simply not the case that, as Fantham’s discussion has been taken to 
infer, Seneca’s grief is totally displaced onto Helvia. Instead, in what is presented as a 
timeless generalisation which nevertheless describes the present situation, this grief (in the 
tragic mode) exceeds all limit (modum excedentis),  running roughshod over the very limit (or 
cultural norm) Seneca hopes his mother will allow him to place on her grief in the final 
phrase of ch.1 (ut desiderio tuo uelis a me modum statui, 1.4). 
 
III  Re-opening wounds: ad Helv.2-4 
In ch.2, however, there is a marked change of tone, as if to retreat from the excess of the 
opening chapter. Seneca now launches into a series of military and medical metaphors, and 
announces his counter-intuitive strategy to expose and re-open all the wounds from traumatic 
events in his mother’s past that have already healed (omnia proferam et rescindam quae iam 
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obducta sunt, 2.1).lix He will not run into battle with her pain straight away (ne statim cum eo 
concurram), but first amplify it. This will not be a gentle healing path, but involve cautery 
and the knife (hoc erit non molli uia mederi, sed urere ac secare, 2.2), as if the philosopher is 
about to perform surgery, after Ovid Remedia 229 (ferrum patieris et ignes). Surgical 
intervention to ‘excise’ wounds or ulcers, and the need to dry out and cauterise wounds to 
prevent gangrene, is frequently mentioned in ancient (quasi-)medical discussions of wound 
treatment in humans and animals.lx Cutting the flesh is also used elsewhere by Seneca (often 
figuratively) to describe the paternal disciplining of children or other family members (cf. de 
Prov. 4.11, de Brev.Vit. 4.5; de Clem. 14.3). Seneca imagines his mother as a body so full of 
scars (corpore tam cicatricoso, 2.2) that she will be ashamed (pudeat) to worry about one 
more wound, whether that uulnus refers to the pain of losing her son, to the new ‘wound’ 
Seneca will ‘cut’, or both. Here he alludes not only to a wider Stoic discourse of bearing 
wounds honorably and courageously that runs through his prose texts, but also to what Van 
Lommel (2015) explores as an unstable set of associations in Roman Republican and imperial 
thought around physical wounds and scars, which potentially signalled military valour and 
success, but could also elicit ridicule and pity, especially if they were disfiguring.lxi Seneca 
then states that he has piled up all Helvia’s misfortunes before her (omnia coaceruata ante te 
posui, 3.2). This latest blow, he writes, is not superficial but has cut deep inside her and split 
her breast and innards (pectus et uiscera ipsa diuisit, 3.1): here the verb diuisit not only 
figures psycho-physical trauma, but also evokes medical constructions of the wounded body 
as divided or as lacking unity.lxii Helvia must be like a veteran soldier, stiff of lip as she 
allows her wounds to be cleaned out (exsaniari, 3.1) by the military doctor, channelling the 
miles bonus of Roman moralising discourse (and of the Roman Stoic imaginary), who in 
Seneca’s de Vita Beata is a figure for Virtue herself, submitting to wounds, and counting her 
scars (15.5).lxiii This quasi-sexual or eroticized violation (uiscera may signify female 
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reproductive organs as well as ‘guts’lxiv) is revived in ch.15, where blood is imagined to flow 
from Helvia’s non-intact, non-virginal body (non ex intacto corpore tuo sanguis hic fluxit, 
15.4) and through the scar of an old wound (per ipsas cicatrices percussa es, 15.4).lxv There, 
Helvia is no longer the wounded veteran soldier on the battlefield, but rather the medically 
healthy gunē of the Hippocratic texts, whose desiderium is channelled into reproduction and 
care and whose opened body bleeds at regular intervals.lxvi The same metaphor of penetration 
is used throughout of grief, explicitly at 18.9 (quotiens te inmodica uis doloris inuaserit).  
In summary, in the first half of ch.2 and in ch.3, Seneca seems symbolically to lift 
himself off the funeral pyre, and to assert his disembodied position of power, qua medic, over 
his mother’s grief. He converts Helvia from a fellow sufferer into patient, and from mourning 
mother into heroic mulier uirilis, drawing both on a medical-philosophical imaginary and on 
an epic-elegiac discourse of wound-based pain. He and his mother are now co-combatants in 
a heroic battle to suppress muliebris dolor.  
Yet there is more going on here than a straightforward reiteration of the heroic wound 
topos.lxvii Seneca’s language and imagery are hyperbolic, almost cartoonish, as if to ‘laugh at 
pain’ (dolorem deridere, Ep. 78.19), so that the affective surplus of the opening chapter is not 
so much overcome as transmuted. In particular, the plan to re-open his mother’s wounds 
sustains the physical closeness between mother and son evoked in ch.1, and seems designed 
to realise the fear expressed in 1.2 that this consolation might turn into an untimely 
exulceratio, all the more so if we compare this strategy to the harsh treatment of Marullus’ 
grief in Ep.99: although in this letter Seneca echoes the ad Heluiam by developing the idea of 
treating wounds harshly (e.g. seuerius ista plaga curanda est, 99.29), he also associates the 
temptation to ‘pile up offences’ (incommode … cumulare, 99.14) with the un-Stoic victim 
rather than with the philosopher-doctor (cf. omnia coaceruata, ad Helv.3.2), and perhaps 
recalls Cicero’s reflection on how he was motivated to pile up all consolatory techniques into 
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his consolation precisely because his soul was in turmoil (erat enim in tumore animus, Tusc. 
3.76). Indeed it is the acervation of trauma, as Degl’Innocenti Pierini observes, which 
connects Helvia with Hecuba, the tragic heroine who in Seneca’s Troades, in particular, is 
weighed down by ‘the disasters of all’ (omnium clades, 1061).lxviii 
Similarly, the motif of rescindere uulnera (2.1) plays here not only to medical texts, 
and to epic scenes of battlefield surgery to remove weapons embedded in flesh that seem 
themselves to be informed by medical knowledge (e.g. Virgil Aen. 12.389-90), but also to 
Senecan scenes of torture and self-harm. See for example Ep. 78.19: 
 
plus est flamma et eculeus et lammina et uulneribus ipsis intumescentibus quod illa 
renouaret et altius urgeret inpressum.  
 
But worse than these are the fire, the rack, the red-hot plates, and the instrument that 
reopens wounds while they are still swollen and drives their imprint deeper still. 
 
Here, Seneca is reminding Lucilius that any physical pain can be overcome, even the worst 
torture. Yet this is the same letter in which he recounts how he consoled himself in the 
midst of painful illness by thinking not of his mother but his father, and he has just told 
Lucilius – again by remembering (the notion of remembering) trauma in Virgil’s Aeneidlxix 
– that there is no benefit in ‘re-handling past pain’ (praeteritos dolores retractare, 78.14) 
and that the key thing to be ‘cut out’ (circumcidenda) is the ‘recollection of past suffering’ 
(ueteris incommodi memoria, 78.14). Nevertheless, this is exactly what he has just done, in 
order to transmit empathy with Lucilius, who also suffers from catarrh and attacks of fever 
(78.1). He has already made the same ‘mistake’ here in the ad Heluiam.  
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Ovid, who is Seneca’s key predecessor in writing (self-)consoling letters from exile 
as the ‘living dead’, makes a similar point about psychological wounds. Just as Helvia is a 
body so wounded that one more wound makes no difference (2.2), so Ovid in Tristia 
2.105-6, and Ex Ponto 2.7.42/4.16.52 compares himself to Actaeon, who in 
Metamorphoses 3 was torn apart by his own hounds (a kind of figurative self-harm) to the 
extent that there were ‘no spaces left for wounds’ (iam loca uulneribus desunt, 3.237).lxx In 
Tristia 3.11, Ovid explores the humiliating (rather than heroic) suffering caused when an 
enemy ‘handles anew’ his ‘raw wounds (et tamen est aliquis, qui uulnera cruda retractet, 
19; rescindere crimina noli, / deque graui duras uolnere tolle manus, 63-4), evoking 
Nestor’s complaint at Met. 12.542-3 (quid… / cogis et obductos annis rescindere luctus?), 
as well as the scene in which he played doctor at Remedia 123-5 (discussed above).  Even 
in ad Marciam 1.5, where Seneca again approaches a woman’s grief after losing her son as 
a uulnus and aims to ‘battle’ with it, the emphasis is not on cutting open an old scar, but 
merely on drawing attention to it so that it might heal (antiqua mala in memoriam reduxi 
et, ut scires hanc quoque plagam esse sanandam, ostendi tibi aeque magni uulneris 
cicatricem). By contrast, to promise to make more wounds, as Seneca does in ad Heluiam 
2-3, is to plunge into what is visualised as trauma, and to risk confusing identification with 
intent to harm, or self-harm.  
In context, therefore, Seneca’s strategy here - in what has been construed as a zero-
sum game of who gets to be the wounded body and who gets to transcend it - is not 
straightforwardly (self-)heroizing. Instead, it summons mixed messages which risk putting 
Hippocratic-Stoic physician in the position of co-patient or passionate aggressor. Chapters 
2-3 of the ad Heluiam seem to blend the near-caricature of the Stoic hero smiling under 
torture or while committing suicide (Cato is the paradigm here: e.g. Ep. 24.6-8, 67.13, cf. 
Petronius at Tac.Ann.16.19), with the ‘unhelpful’ or pathological tendency to reopen 
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emotional wounds that belong to the past, to drown in grief rather than suppressing it. Cato 
may have been ‘heroic’ in ‘wounding his own wounds’ (uulnera uulnerat sua, Tranq. 
16.4), yet the objective in his case was to die, not to console or heal. This cross-fertilisation 
of subject positions and of present/past is perhaps best figured by Seneca’s response to 
Ovidian exilic poetry, through which we might imagine Seneca taking up the perverse role 
of Ovid’s arch-enemy back in Rome, ‘re-handling’ the exile’s wounds, which have now 
become his own mother’s uulnera.  
In other words, the dynamic of ‘displacement’ observed by Fantham in the ad 
Heluiam is developed into a much more complex role-swapping and multiplication of 
subject positions. The disturbance of grief underpins an experiment in stepping into others’ 
frames of reference, in realising – as Seneca puts it in Ep. 78.4 – that the underlying 
consolation offered by consolatory literature is amicorum adfectus (the affection of 
friends), or the idea that we should continue to live not with others, but for and through 
them (putabam, inquam, me uicturum non cum illis, sed per illos). As Seneca states at the 
end of this epistle, the space of the (consolatory) letter itself creates the conditions for an 
exchange which is also a meeting – or joining/mixing – of minds and souls in anticipation 
of a reunion: 
 
His te cogitationibus recrea et interim epistulis nostris uaca. Ueniet aliquando tempus, 
quod nos iterum iungat ac misceat; quantulumlibet sit illud, longum faciet scientia 
utendi. 
         Ep. 78.28 
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Refresh yourself with thoughts as these, and meanwhile reserve some hours for our 
letters. There will come a time when we shall be united again and brought together; 
however short this time may be, we shall make it long by knowing how to use it. 
 
Here, and in the ad Heluiam, the consolatory text is an affectively charged dimension 
which allows ‘participants’ to stay with the experience of shared vulnerability. Indeed, 
Seneca hints at the role literature plays in not only distracting from the pain of a cut, exposed 
body, but also in productively accompanying or even prolonging woundedness. Earlier in Ep. 
78, for example, Lucilius is advised to think of the man who continued to read his book as he 
had his varicose veins excised, a version of the motif of Cato reading Plato’s Phaedo before 
having his veins cut and then rebandaged by doctors (78.18, cf. Ep. 24.7-8), which is 
developed by Tacitus in the famous scenes of Seneca’s and Petronius’ suicide: Seneca 
dictates a text to his secretaries while racked with pain from severed arteries, and Petronius 
has his veins cut, bandaged, and opened again, while listening not to philosophical speeches 
but to ‘light songs and frivolous verses’ (Ann. 15.63-4, 16.19).  The ad Heluiam varies this 
theme in the image of Helvia reading this very text as she experiences her wounds and as she 
is encouraged to read books that, in entering into her mind (animum tuum intrauerint), will 
substitute the invasive power of grief (numquam amplius intrabit dolor, 17.5).  
The keeping open or re-opening of wounds in the ad Heluiam sustains a pile-up 
(omnia coaceruata, 3.2) of contradictory perspectives and experiences that are not reducible 
simply to Seneca’s vicarious display of military virtue through the body of his masculinised 
mother, or to a performance of domination over the mother as matter. While Ovidian exile is 
staged as an oedipal drama of separation from the patria and from parricidal poetry which 
results in the fictional loss of his mother-tongue,lxxi Seneca’s exile from his optima mater 
refuses the separation of son from mother and recasts it as ambivalent emotional and physical 
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intimacy in a traumatic present. Thus Helvia’s wound is still ‘fresh’ as Seneca writes 
(grauissimum est … recens uulnus, 3.1), just as it was in the past, a time her son was waiting 
to be over before writing to her (dolori tuo, dum recens saeuiret, sciebam occurrendum non 
esse, 1.2). And while her fortune ‘totally depends’ on his (tota ex mea pendet, 4.1), Helvia’s 
corpus non intactum is, overtly, the condition of possibility for Seneca’s existence. The more 
he lays figurative hands to her body-in-pain, and envisages her uiscera split open, the more 
he hints at the trauma of childbirth and at the cultural connections between childbirth and 
grief developed in the final chapters of the text (where attention is drawn to Helvia’s virtuous 
fertility and the exemplarity of women like Cornelia, who lost ten of the twelve children she 
bore), and the more he reminds his audience that he was born from his mother’s body. Just as 
a doctor’s physical closeness to his patients is highlighted in ch.3, so a Greco-Roman medical 
imaginary of the female adult body as constituted by an opening that never stops bleeding 
(especially in childbirth) underwrites Seneca’s metaphor of maternal grief as physical 
wound.lxxii We might recall the famous simile at Iliad 11.267-72, in which the pain suffered 
by wounded Agamemnon is likened to the agony of a woman in labour, and compare the 
image of pains, which come upon or make their way into (dŷnon) Agamemnon’s strong body 
like an arrow (bélos) in 11.268-9, with Seneca’s description of Helvia as a soldier transfixed 
(implicitly, by a weapon), as well as with the uncanny image of  wounds ‘piercing’ or ‘going 
down into’ her flesh (descenderunt), at ad Helu. 3.1.lxxiii In his Moralia, Plutarch assumes that 
in order to write about this kind of pain, Homer must have experienced it, or even have been 
in the midst of it: ‘These lines, women say, were written not by Homer but by a Homerid, 
having given birth or while she was still in the throes of it and had the pain of labour, bitter 
and sharp, in her entrails.’ (Mor.496d). As if to enter into the spirit of Plutarch’s reading, 
Seneca makes his mother’s maternal dolor inseparable from his own, and shows that the very 
experience of woundedness unconceals a permeability between self and other: as he puts it at 
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17.1, grief ‘is born’ (nascitur), just as Helvia’s giving birth (to him) is the origin of (the 
conjoining of) physical and emotional suffering in this text.  
 
IV. Grief and time: measuring excess 
The contradictory texture of the opening chapters, which both acknowledge the extent 
to which all great grief exceeds spatial and temporal limits (omnis … magnitudo doloris 
modum excedentis, 1.3) and also assert the need to fix a limit on it (ut desiderio tuo uelis a me 
modum statui, 1.4), ushers in a nexus of structuring paradoxes, or near-paradoxes, in the more 
sober central section of this dialogue (chs.5-14), to which we now turn. The motif of setting a 
modus on (Helvia’s) grief while also, as we have seen, dwelling on its productive excess 
(indeed Seneca acknowledges at 16.1 that female grief is legitimately inmoderatum, or paene, 
‘almost’) is developed in ch.11 as the Stoic principle of respecting nature’s boundaries. Thus 
‘the person who restrains himself within the bounds of nature (intra naturalem modum) will 
not notice poverty, and whoever exceeds these bounds (qui naturalem modum excedet) will 
be pursued by poverty however rich they are’ (11.4). Yet Seneca’s consolation of his mother 
in her grief appeals both to the male aristocratic dignity upheld by keeping within a 
conventional limit  or by maintaining bodily-moral integrity and to the freedom felt in 
realising that the (Stoic, but also Roman imperial) mind obeys no modus, in that it transcends 
geographical boundaries and earthly time. This freedom now finds its provocative echo, I 
suggest, in Helvia’s overwhelming ‘female’ grief and in Seneca’s participation in, opening up 
and sharing of her wounds in the opening chapters of this text.   
Setting an (ethical) modus on grief is a spatio-temporal metaphor: the limit makes 
things stands still, and upright (the verb, as we saw above, is statuo, 1.4), preventing the 
subject from continuing to lie horizontal in a living death (ipso rogo, 1.3), from crouching or 
crawling (reptare, 1.1) and from giving in to the endless movement, or imperfect tense, of 
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grief.lxxiv At the same time, nature, of which the human animus - in Stoic terms – is a part, is 
itself continually moving, in ‘perpetual agitation’ (perpetua agitatio, 6.7): divine nature 
‘delights and even finds preservation in continual and very rapid movement’ (dei natura 
adsidua et citatissima commutatione uel delectet uel conseruet, 6.8). In chapters 6 and 7, 
Seneca famously makes the point that human migration – whether voluntary or involuntary 
(as in exile) – is normal and natural. Rome itself was founded by an exile, and is now a city 
packed with immigrants, as is Corsica, which ‘has more foreigners than locals’ (6.4). Some 
have even suggested, he notes, that the human spirit is innately restless and always wants to 
change location, delighting in novelty, all of which is to say that exile is not painful in the 
least. Yet crucially, the term Seneca uses to describe the flighty, restless human mind, made 
of the same stuff as divine spirit, is irritation (inritationem animis, 6.6). In other words, the 
emotional incitements or exulceratio of the opening chapters subtly underwrite the politically 
provocative notion that there is no such thing as exile (nullum exilium, 8.5): psychic 
‘irritation’ is now recast, therapeutically, as a generative quality, and is used to celebrate 
cosmopolitanism.  
Seneca goes on to qualify his investment in imperial movement by separating out 
‘natural’ conquest (‘wherever the Roman conquers, he lives’, 7.7) from a corrupt empire 
which promotes an effeminising loss of control over appetites that should be bounded (ad 
Helu. 8, 10): the expansive, disquieted mind (inquieta mens) is not to be identified with 
uncontrolled, small bodies (parua … corpora, 10.6). Yet later on, in 14.3, he again draws on 
the figure of maternity to test the boundaries of a law that sets limits, praising his mother for 
‘always setting a limit’ (inposuisti modum) on the generosity of her sons, while not limiting 
her own (cum tuae non inponeres). The perpetual force of the mother’s grief and love, the 
expansiveness of the wounded mother who has nurtured her son inside her own body and 
thereby embodies the Stoic principle that as spirit we are all one, now suggests a model for 
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reflecting on and experiencing unboundedness in nature and the cosmos. This unboundedness 
and borderlessless (of grief, the wounded body, the intellectually ambitous mind, nature 
herself) is made distinct from corrupt human drives towards exceeding modi. In this way, 
Seneca cleaves a space for a virtuous male grief by offering a way to resist always collapsing 
that grief into a tragic, female lack of integrity, both bodily and moral. As Seneca writes at 
10.10, puta pecuniae modum ad rem pertinere, non animi: it is the ‘measure’ of the mind, our 
mental horizons, which we should seek to expand, not our coffers, which should be kept 
within modest limits. It is this very meditation on expansive connectedness which affords the 
possibility of consoling the inconsolable mother, and also of turning this consolatory letter 
from exile into a new kind of consolatio ad se. Helvia will be comforted not by having her 
grief removed, in the conventional modern understanding of consolation’s function (it will 
persist, and is persisting as we read), but by immersing herself in unboundedness: in the 
domestic sphere, this is felt not only as a rupture of bodily integrity, but as intimacy and 
unconditional love (embodied in the mother), while the domestic also offers a template for 
understanding a larger, borderless reality. In this way, omnia maxima ac minima (8.3) are 
brought together, the exile’s alienation is reconfigured, and mother and son are united under 
the same vast sky (8.6, 20.2). 
In the central chapters of the ad Heluiam, and as Seneca again turns towards his 
mother (after 14.1, mater carissima), we see him toy with the ethical ambiguity of (female) 
grief, which can be more or less inmoderatum, but not inmensum (16.1), an adjective he uses 
several times elsewhere to indicate morally corrupt, uncontrolled appetites (inmensis epulis; 
inmensum … arbitrium, 10.10). He sustains this tension between expressiveness/ 
expansiveness and moral limit in 16.1, where we are asked to recall the cap of ten months 
placed by the maiores on women mourning lost husbands, a time span that in Roman terms 
matches that of pregnancy:lxxv 
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et ideo maiores decem mensum spatium lugentibus uiros dederunt ut cum pertinacia 
muliebris maeroris publica constitutione deciderent. Non prohibuerunt luctus sed 
finierunt; nam et infinito dolore, cum aliquem ex carissimis amiseris, adfici stulta 
indulgentia est, et nullo inhumana duritia: optimum inter pietatem et rationem 
temperamentum est et sentire desiderium et opprimere. 
       ad Heluiam 16.1 
 
For this reason our ancestors allotted a space of ten months' mourning for women who 
had lost their husbands, thus settling the violence of a woman's grief by public decree. 
They did not forbid them to mourn, but they set limits to their grief: for while it is a 
foolish weakness to give way to endless grief when you lose one of those dearest to you, 
yet it shows an unnatural hardness of heart to express no grief at all: the best middle 
course between affection and hard common sense is both to feel the longing of grief and 
to restrain it. 
 
Having just drawn attention to her non-intact body at the end of ch.15, it is notable that 
Seneca makes direct reference to Helvia’s pregnancies in the same chapter, praising her for 
not hiding her swelling belly (just as he is not hiding it here), and for not ending her 
children’s lives prematurely by abortion (nec intra uiscera tua conceptas spes liberorum 
elisisti, 16.3). Curiously, in thinking about the female experience of time in mourning and 
about the male determination to impose an end on what it wants to see as a trackable linear 
process, Seneca imagines himself going back in time to witness his own pregnant mother’s 
behaviour (he does not mention whether he is referring to her gestation of him, but the lack 
of detail allows this uncanniness to linger). Meanwhile, the rejected possibility of abortion, 
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raised only to be repressed (Helvia chose not to inflict wounds on her own uiscera in order 
to avoid the burden of Seneca/children, and the agony of losing them/him later) recalls the 
striking scene of Helvia’s grief cutting into uiscera ipsa at 3.1, and Seneca’s promise to use 
his philosophical knife on her (rescindam, 2.1; secare, 2.2).  
Crucially, having reminded Helvia what their ancestors believed, in the distant past, 
Seneca also mentions that she knows women who never stopped mourning their lost sons 
(16.2). In grief, as in pregnancy, each ending is a possible new beginning: the new-born 
child, as all tragic and consolatory literature knows, is both a great joy and the potential for 
unimaginable pain. Moreover, Seneca does not say what the limit for his mother’s grief is 
or should be now, only that infinite mourning is self-indulgent. Again, the text poses that 
modus as a provocation that is haunted by the open wounds of the mother’s fertile, birthing 
body, and is challenged throughout by competing, non-linear temporalities of mourning. 
The irritation is nailed down at 16.1 in the sententious phrase sentire desiderium et 
opprimere, where the conjunction et can indicate both a sequence (first feel, then stop 
feeling) and an upsetting simultaneity (feel and repress at the same time, let it out and be 
numb, ad infinitum). It reverberates, too, in the sententious concluding statement of 
Seneca’s paragraph on Helvia’s sister, in whom Helvia will find either an end to her 
suffering, or a companion for it, as if the latter is just as good as the former, despite it 
implying that her pain may well carry on (apud illam inuenies uel finem doloris tui uel 
comitem, 19.3). The final chapters of the text are punctuated by thoughts of repeated or 
continuing pain (Quotiens te inmodica uis doloris inuaserit, 18.9; cogitationes tamen tuas 
subinde ad me recurrere, 20.1), and of a comfort that is always deferred to the future (dum 
in illum portum … peruenis, 18.1).  
Similarly, in 17.1, having made his strongest statement, again in militaristic terms, 
that Helvia should control and conquer her sorrow, Seneca then states: ‘I know that this is not 
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something which is in our power (in nostra potestate), and that no strong feeling is under our 
control,  least of all that which arises from sorrow, for it is ferocious (ferox) and stubborn 
(contumax) in the face of any remedy.’ The adjective contumax, echoing licet omnis maeror 
contumax sit in 1.4, reverberates with all the trauma of the consolation’s agitated beginning. 
The impetus of ch.1 is again revived when Seneca admits at 17.2 that the pain of grief tends 
to ‘regain its force to savage us’ (impetum ad saeuiendum colligit) by the very fact of having 
been made to withdraw (ipsa quiete), another nod towards the idea explored in Aeneid 12, 
where Turnus’ anger is inflamed by healing (aegrescitque medendo, Aen.12.46). Grief returns 
(resurgit) and undermines us (subruit). It must be conquered, once and for all, Seneca 
counters, by ratio and by liberal studies, but this argument again leads us back to the past, to 
loss, and to familial ties: if only Helvia’s husband had been less devoted to the cultural norms 
of the maiores, who thought women should not be exposed to philosophy, she might have 
acquired resources useful for managing her grief now (17.4).  
In reminding Helvia of her absent husband (the penultimate uulnus in 2.4), Seneca’s 
reflection on how traditional Roman rigidity (the consuetudo maiorum) limited his mother’s 
life risks undermining the exemplarity of the maiores who dictated for how long women 
mourned their husbands at 16.1, and gestures again towards the need to transgress rather than 
respect modi. Those limits, he hints, are not absolute but cultural. They are context-specific, 
and shift over time.lxxvi Seneca comes close to usurping (or to going back in time and 
rewriting) the role of his own father when he urges his mother to study philosophy, or in 
other words to do what her husband disapproved of, thereby suggesting that he would have 
been the better partner, more attentive to her talents.lxxvii Just as Seneca turns his gaze onto his 
mother’s (lost) past with her husband/his father, so Helvia is to ‘turn back to’ or ‘fall back 
on’lxxviii her studies (nunc ad illas reuertere, 17.4): the verb reuerto resonates not only with 
her missed opportunities or longing for what is lost yet may again be found, but also with the 
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exile’s desire to return, not least to his mother.lxxix Seneca intervenes in his own father’s 
disciplinary authority, acting at once as the substitute father and as the anti-father determined 
to identify with Helvia and thus to subvert the Oedipal drama by which the patriarch forcibly 
detaches son from mother.  
 
V. Entanglements 
I would like, in this final section, to address the last part of the consolation (18-20), which - 
as many scholars emphasize - offers comfort to Helvia by mapping out for her the network of 
loved-ones who, unlike Seneca, can be near her. This solacium takes shape not only in the 
literal content of Seneca’s prose, but also – more intensively – in its poetics. Thus Helvia 
should lean on Seneca’s brothers, her sons, whose inmost feelings (intimos adfectus) Seneca 
knows and who bend their lives around their mother’s (tibi … tibi … tibi, 18.1-2). Her 
devotion to her two other sons will take the place of her longing for the absent one (unius 
desiderium … supplebitur, 18.3), where desiderium echoes the consolation’s passionate 
beginning, as discussed in section II.lxxx She will be cheered by the playfulness and humour 
of her grandson Marcus (18.4), and is urged to embrace Novatilla (18.7), her granddaughter 
by adoption, and finally her sister (19). Yet at every step, this softer consolation serves not to 
distract Helvia from Seneca’s absence, but to emphasize the extent to which they are 
emotionally and biologically intertwined. Indeed, already in ch.2, Seneca begins to chart the 
extent to which his mother’s experience is woven into his own, and vice versa. He begins by 
reminding her that she (and the implication is, she too) lost her mother (amisisti matrem, 2.4), 
and was an abandoned child, the first of a chain of events that saw the loss of her uncle, her 
husband, and finally the death of three grandchildren, including Seneca’s son. This final loss 
merges grandmother and son in shared grief. In 2.5, Helvia ‘received back the bones of three 
grandchildren’ (ossa trium nepotum recepisti) to the same ‘lap/womb’ (sinus) from which she 
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had let them go, an image which again places the focus on the mother’s generative/loving 
body, and conjures up elegiac scenes of poet-lovers who have relegated themselves to foreign 
lands, and who wonder – from a very different perspective - whether their own bones will be 
recovered by their mother, or their lover. See for example Tibullus 1.3.5-6, and Propertius 
1.17.11-12: 
 
            non hic mihi mater  
quae legat in maestos ossa perusta sinus.  
Tib. 1.3.5-6 
No mother have I here  
to gather the burned bones to her grieving bosom. 
 
an poteris siccis mea fata reposcere ocellis,  
       ossaque nulla tuo nostra tenere sinu?  
Prop. 1.17.11-12 
Will you be able to ask about my death dry-eyed,  
and never hold my bones to your breast? 
 
Through Roman erotic elegy, Helvia’s sorrows ring with echoes of the male exile’s 
desiderium. The final blow, which comes in the news that her son has been sent into exile, is 
expressed by Seneca as follows: raptum me audisti (2.5).  As well as evoking unspeakable 
tearing (cf. dilectum verborum eripiat, 1.3), the word raptum allows the mother’s grief to 
materialise as a perspective on Seneca’s page, by suggesting not the exile of an adult man, 
but rather the premature death of a young boy (cf. aetate prima raptum,  Ep. 99.31), a child 
torn from the refuge of its mother’s body, or a young boy violated like a girl, whose puerilis 
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hilaritas, boyish glee, Seneca imagines his mother thinking about, at chapter 15.1; the same 
word, hilaritas, is then used in 18.5 to describe the joyful humour of a small child, Helvia’s 
grandson Marcus. Raptum stands out, because when it is used of persons the past participle of 
rapio is almost always in the feminine in classical Latin, and is applied to elegiac girls, the 
Sabine women, Briseis, Proserpina, and so on, except when it is used of raped boys, like 
Ganymede.lxxxi Thus having used hyperbolic force to gain new intimacy with his mother’s 
uulnera, Seneca now writes himself into his text, in unspoken flashes, through his grieving 
mother’s eyes, as a young boy, and as a passive victim of male violence. The only similar use 
of raptus referring to an adult citizen male in Latin literature comes at Ovid, Tr. 3.3.52 (non 
tibi nunc primum, lux mea, raptus ero / ‘not now for the first time, light of mine, shall I have 
been torn from you’), where Ovid addresses his wife, again perhaps with the same empathetic 
importing of a ‘female’ experience of grief.  
In chapter 19, the intertwining of subjects constituted by relationality intensifies 
further. Helvia is to seek out the embrace of Novatilla, who like both Seneca and Helvia has 
lost her mother, and whose role as Seneca’s adopted daughter sets Seneca and Helvia in 
parallel: he is a father to her; Helvia will be not a grandmother but a mother to her, acting for 
Seneca (pro me, 18.7), and a great grandmother to future children. Even this duty is a 
substitution (officium pro remedio erit, 18.8). In the next thought, Helvia’s father would be a 
great comfort to her if only he were not absent (nisi abesset, 18.9), a sentence which reads as 
a barely veiled displacement of Seneca’s own (paternalistic? Oedipal?) desire to console his 
mother, especially as her father (unlike Seneca’s father, Helvia’s husband) is absent but still 
alive (illo uiuo, 18.9), just like the exiled son. Helvia should preserve herself for her father 
rather than sacrifice or ‘deplete’ herself for Seneca (iustius sit te illi seruari quam mihi 
inpendi, 18.9), because the happiness of his old age depends on her (in te uertitur, 18.9), just 
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as in turn, Helvia’s fortune was said to hang on that of her son in chapter 4 (tota ex mea 
pendet, 4.1).  
Finally, she should ‘join herself’, emotionally and physically, to her sister or step-
sister, who was a mother to Seneca during his long illness, who like Helvia has lost a husband 
(also lost as an uncle to Seneca) and whose combined grief for both Helvia and exiled Seneca 
conjoins consoler and consoled in a different way again. The sister not only grieves for 
Helvia, or in her place (non tantum pro te dolet, 19.2), but also incarnates what is by now a 
familiar dynamic of substitution in this text: she was his mother, acted as his mother, when 
she gave him her maternal care (maternoque nutricio) through long illness (19.2), and 
conquered shyness for his sake (pro me uicit, 19.2) when supporting him for the quaestorship. 
Thus the wounded Seneca of the opening chapters of the consolation returns here, writing 
again from the position of aeger rather than medicus; illness, moreover, is seen as the catalyst 
for mutual transformation. The sister’s role as Stoic exemplum also involves importing, once 
more, a tragic modality of mourning: while Helvia was made to channel Hecuba, her trauma 
piled up before her, the sister – it is implied – has the talent to play Alcestis, whom poets 
celebrate as the ‘woman who offered to die in her husband’s place’ (nobilitatur carminibus 
omnium quae se pro coniuge uicariam dedit, 19.5).lxxxii In other words, the very system of 
virtuous substitution promoted in this text as a source of consolation must also generate and 
regurgitate trauma, not least because it reminds Helvia here of the loss of her own husband 
(uirum … extulisti, 2.4), while shrouding that loss, through Alcestis, in survivors’ guilt. Yet 
that return to and residing in sorrow, the experience of the maerentes, can spur a sharing (tu 
ad illam te…confer, 19.3) and bring a comfort that does not consist necessarily, in the 
lessening or removal of grief.  
Meanwhile Seneca now wants not only to reconfigure Helvia’s pain, but also to take it 
on, as another tragic figure, the Oedipal scapegoat (quidquid matri dolendum fuit, in me 
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transierit, quidquid auiae, in me. ‘whatever you were destined to suffer as a mother and a 
grandmother, may it pass to me’; … fuerim tantum nihil amplius doliturae domus piamentum. 
/ ‘[I will not complain]…if only I prove to be the scapegoat for a family that will suffer no 
more.’ 18.6). The stylistic register of this passage and in particular the triple anaphora of in 
me, as Degli’Innocenti Pierini notes, is typical of high tragic drama.lxxxiii Yet the scene of a 
tragic hero declaring themselves the vessel for everyone else’s pain recalls not just Seneca’s 
Oedipus (mortifera mecum uitia terrarium extraho./ … mecum ite, mecum, Oed. 1058-61) but 
also his Jocasta, who in the Phoenissae, tells her warring sons in me arma et ignes uertite, in 
me omnis ruat (443).lxxxiv Seneca is Hecuba, Alcestis, Jocasta, a mother and grandmother, a 
sick, Oedipal son at the centre of a cursed house held together by grief and love. Stoic 
communality is not just a consoling theoretical concept, it is implied, but an ethical 
orientation and perpetual struggle in which each family member is exposed to the pain of the 
other, even to the point of tragic (self-)sacrifice. What Williams (2006, 169) calls ‘the 
warmth of group comfort’ is fraught, in Senecan poetics, by ambivalence, conflicted 
emotions, and ethical responsibilities that are difficult to heed. 
 
V. Conclusions.  
I have argued that what might look like a dynamic of displacement in the ad Heluiam 
amounts to an intricate pattern of substitution in which Seneca both identifies with and 
distinguishes himself from his mother while immersing himself in a living circuit of real and 
imagined ethical relations. In this networked yet unique poetic experiment in Stoic ethics, 
Seneca is interested in the violent challenge to singular subjectivity that the maternal might 
represent, as a point of departure for ethical responsibility itself, and as a modality of political 
resistance. The ad Heluiam does not just do the work of self-fashioning, or extend cura sui 
to, as Foucault puts it, ‘the attention one devotes to care that others should take of 
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themselves’.lxxxv Its literary excess and affective intensity disrupt self-coherence and linear 
time in ways that perform the experience of mourning in empathy with the perpetually 
wounded mother, and reveal what is missing in Foucault’s tendentious account of imperial 
Stoicism as a quasi-medical regimen and as a social practice. This is a text that presents the 
uulnera of grief and loss as productive or therapeutic, even joyful, and at the same time as 
perverse, a frightening intimacy that lays open the fortress of male Stoic identity to desire, 
submission, the ‘tragic’ trauma of dependency. It is in proximity to the mother’s wounded 
body that the philosophical-medical subject is torn. In other words, Seneca’s porous, dramatic 
writing allows us to experience what is at stake - both positively and negatively - in rejecting 
a care of the self that is a model for governing rather than relating to others, and whose goal 
is to engage ‘without desire and without disturbance’ (Foucault 1986, 68). We must still 
situate the ad Heluiam within an androcentric philosophical tradition which uses maternity 
and the maternal body as models for alterity and as figures for (male) ethical relation, in ways 
that have been the focus of much feminist critique.lxxxvi At the same time, in addressing not 
just a mother but the mother, in a text which displays its wounds as remedia, Seneca makes 
space for thinking about ‘what politics might be implied by staying with the thought of 
corporeal vulnerability itself’.lxxxvii It is in the playful parallel dimension of literature, he 
shows, that we can imagine ways of being-for-the-other while tolerating, momentarily, the 
conflicts it elicits. In this ever-expandable now, exile can only provide the conditions for 
resisting separation, and for re-asserting attachment.   
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Endnotes: 
i See McAuley (2016, 169) for summary discussion of ancient works, letters and speeches 
possibly addressed to the authors’ wives and to (other men’s) mothers.  
ii On the hybridic form of Greco-Roman consolation generally, see Kassel 1958, Baltussen 
2013, Scourfield 2013, Kaufman 2014; on the constellation of Senecan consolatory works, 
see especially Wilson 2013.  
iii Nussbaum 1994, 395. Nussbaum’s striking lack of interest in Seneca’s consolations and 
consolatory Letters is indicative here. The marginalisation of these texts, despite the boom in 
Senecan studies in recent decades, continues to be a significant feature of scholarship on 
Seneca and on Roman Stoicism: it is reflected, for example, in the Cambridge Companion to 
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Seneca (Bartsch-Schiesaro 2015), which includes no chapter on consolation and not a single 
reference to consolation as a mode or theme in its index; a similar picture emerges from 
Bartsch-Wray’s landmark Seneca and the Self (2009).  
iv Henderson 2002, Ker 2009, Gunderson 2015, Dressler 2012 and 2016, with Rimell 2015, 
113-98. Cf. Schafer 2011, Wilson 2013, 109. 
v Inwood 2005, e.g. 89-91. Cf. Wildberger 2018.  
vi Wilson 2013. We can go some way to thinking through Seneca’s interest in grief through 
what McIvor 2012 observes as a ‘split orientation of mourning’ in the more recent work of 
Judith Butler: see Butler 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2009, where she begins to see mourning 
as a resource for democratic politics and for critiquing normativity.  
vii Foucault 1986, 2005; Hadot 1995; cf. e.g. Nussbaum 1994, 13-14.  
viii Although length prohibits me from exploring it in detail here, the substantial body of 
interdisciplinary work which explores the creative or productive potential of dwelling on loss, 
in response to Freud’s evolving thinking on mourning and melancholy (esp. Freud 1917, 
1923), offers stimulus to understanding the conflicts and paradoxes I am drawing out in 
Seneca. See e.g. essays (including Butler’s, cf. n.6, in Eng and Kazanjian 2003), Barthes 
2011, Michaelson 2015.  
ix Holmes 2010, e.g. 5. Cf. King 2018, esp. 26-30.  
x See especially Kristeva’s essay stabat mater in Kristeva 1987, with Söderbäck 2011.  
xi In opposition to the ideal moral-as-physical integrity of the free Roman male: cf. Walters 
1997. On the (rhetoric of) the display of ‘good’ wounds in Rome, and on ambiguous attitudes 
to wounded Roman veterans, see Leigh 1995, Van Lommel 2015.  
xii Cf. Gloyn 2014 e.g. 452 on the ad Polybium as a ‘multifaceted text’.  
xiii E.g. Wilson 2013 sees ‘abstention from philosophy’ as the most striking characteristic of 
the ad Heluiam (cf. Graver 2009, 235: ‘The consolatory letters and treatises of antiquity are 
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not, on the whole, philosophically ambitious’) whereas for the editor of Hadot 1987 (=1995), 
consolation is the ‘ideal genre in which to practice philosophy’. 
xiv E.g. for Ferrill 1966 the consolation is addressed to the emperor. Cf. Abel (1967, 48ff.), 
Griffin (1976, 21-2, 60-1), André 1995, Fantham 2007. 
xv Williams 2006, 148, cf. Ker 2009, 97-100, Hinds 2011, 57-8. 
xvi E.g. Reydams-Schils 2005, Gloyn 2017. Cf. Nussbaum 1994, 359-401 on ‘extirpation of 
the passions’ in Stoic thought. Curry 2018 emphasizes a drive towards ideal ‘wholeness’ in 
the ad Heluiam.  
xvii E.g. Wilcox 2006, Wilson 2013. The idea of self-consolation echoes Cicero, who 
describes his (lost) Consolatio ad se in ad Att.12.14.3. See Ker 2009, 88-9 on ‘the exiled 
Seneca’s novel role of departed consoler’, vis à vis Cicero. 
xviii Cf. Fantham 2007, 175 n.11, McAuley 2016, 170. On the charge of adultery see Griffin 
1976, 59-62.  
xix Williams 2006, 149. 
xx Foucault 1986, 52-3, cf. Hadot 1995, 22-3, Foucault 2005, Scourfield 2013.  
xxi E.g. Williams 2014, 152. For a summary of approaches, see Sauer 2014.  
xxii McAuley 2016, 201. 
xxiii On debates around Stoic ‘proto-feminism’ (not a claim I am making for Seneca here), see 
Asmis 1996, Aikin and McGill-Rutherford 2014, with further bibliography.  
xxiv I have used Reynolds’ Oxford Classical Text (1977, reprinted 1983) throughout.  
xxv Curry 2018 defuses the issue by suggesting that Seneca’s ‘likening of himself to a corpse 
and his description of his own sense of being wounded demonstrate how great his need for 
rebuilding a healthy self-esteem as an exile is.’ (49).  
xxvi Cf. Salazar 2000, 223, for whom the simile in ad Helu.3.1 ‘gives one a general idea of the 
prevailing attitude towards courage and the contempt for those who lack it’.  
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xxvii Irigaray 1985.  
xxviii Reydams-Schils 2005, 139; Gloyn 2017, 28; cf. Berges 2015, 42, 159-60, Wildberger 
2018. 
xxix Gloyn 2017, 33-47, cf. Williams 2006, 168-70.   
xxx Cf. Ker 2009, 96, taking ad Marciam 14.3 as a spur, on the unsettling alliance between the 
(violent) conqueror and the consoler who sets out to ‘conquer’ grief. As he puts it, ‘Senecan 
consolation is cognizant of its own acceptance of, even complicity in, the moral violence 
required for the social reintegration of the bereaved’. The ad Heluiam dwells on that violence 
yet also makes it inseparable from the experience of (shared) grief. 
xxxi Inwood 2005, e.g. 1-2, 31-2 on ‘distorting’ metaphor in Seneca.  
xxxii Gilligan 1982, Irigaray 1985, Kittay 1999, Held 2006. Fuller bibliography on feminist 
care ethics (which affirms the moral significance of the fundamental elements of relationships 
and dependencies in human life) is too expansive to cite here, but see esp. Noddings 1984, 
Cavarero 1997, Murphy 2011 and Whitney 2011 in Bergoffen and Weiss 2011, LaChance 
Adams 2014.  
xxxiii Cf. again Inwood 2005, 89-91 on Seneca’s ‘two-level mode of discourse’.  
xxxiv On (literal and metaphorical) uulnera as a condition of human life, and on the question of 
what they mean or stand for, and how to respond to, tolerate and heal them in Seneca, see de 
Prov. 4.4, 4.7, 5.3, 5.9, de Const.Sap. 6.3, 16.2, 19.3, Ira 1.16.7, ad Marc. 1.8, 9.3, 22.3, de 
Vit.Beat. 15.5, de Tranq. 16.4, ad Pol. 6.2, 12.4, 14.1, Ep. 59.12. 65.12, 67.6, 67.7, 78.19, 
85.29, 95.15, 95.83, 96.1, 99.1, 99.29, 104.12.  
xxxv Cf. Cicero Tusc. 3.76. Developments in philosophy and medicine (which began, says 
Seneca, with thinking about how to treat wounds), and the move towards ‘complicated 
variety’ (multiplex uarietas) in both fields, are seen as analogous in Ep.95.15.  
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xxxvi Interesting recent discussion of tragic catharsis as medical purging in Critchley 2019, 
187-195.  
xxxvii Cf. Butler 2004, 21-2: ‘Perhaps, rather, one mourns when one accepts that by the loss 
one undergoes one will be changed, possibly for ever…maybe when we undergo what we do, 
something about who we are is revealed, something that delineates the ties we have to others, 
that shows us that these ties constitute what we are’. See also n.6 and n.8. 
xxxviii Foucault 1986, e.g. 101 (care of the self ‘implied a medical perception of the world’) et 
passim.  
xxxix Trans. my own (et passim, unless stated otherwise).  
xl Cf. Cic. Div. 1.111, Ovid, Met. 7.10f., Sen. Ben. 2.14.1. OLD s.v. impetus 5, 7. 
xli Cf. OLD s.v. impetus 3b; Thes. VII.1.608, 36ff., 51ff. 
xlii Cf. Cicero Tusc. 3.76, with Sen. Ep. 99.1 (adflicto enim et magnum uulnus male ferenti 
paulisper cedendum est).  
xliii βάλλει βάλλει μ᾽ ἐτύμα / φθογγά του στίβον κατ᾽ ἀνάγκαν / ἕρποντος 
xliv E.g. ad Pol. 14.1, Ep. 78.4, 99.32.  
xlv The aim as outlined in Tusc. 4.35 is to make the consoled person disinterested in his object 
of desire, by convincing him how insignificant it is, how easily it can be secured from 
elsewhere, or put out of mind. He can be distracted by diversions or a change of scene, and 
many also think an old love can be driven out by a new one. Ovid offers precisely these cures 
in the same order in the Rem. 
xlvi Seneca’s gerundives in 1.2 (ad sustinenda remedia … ad compescendos moderandosque 
luctus) also pick up Ovid’s ille dolor uerbis emoderandus erit at Rem. 130. On the (absent) 
mother in the Remedia, see Rimell forthcoming and Starnone forthcoming. Cf. Seneca in Ep. 
99’s letter within a letter, in which he told Marullus nec putaui leniter illum debere tractari 
(99.1).  
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xlvii Houghton 2013, cf. Ov. Rem. 81 (opprime…mala semina morbi), and Ars 1.89-90, 2.717-
18, 3.752.  
xlviii On Seneca’s often overt engagement with Ovid, see Degl’Innocentri Pierini 1990, Hinds 
2011, Michalopoulos 2020. 
xlix Cf. Pichon 1991, 302.  
l uidi ego, quod fuerat primo sanabile, uulnus / dilatum longae damna tulisse morae. Cf. 
Pinotti 1988 ad loc. 
li Cupissem itaque primis temporibus ad istam curationem accedere.  
lii 381-2: ἐάν τις ἐν καιρῷ γε μαλθάσσῃ κέαρ / καὶ μὴ σφριγῶντα θυμὸν ἰσχναίνῃ βίᾳ. Cf. 
Ovid Rem.133-4 (quin etaim accedes uitia irritesque uetando, / temporibus si non aggrediare 
suis).  
liii See Tarrant 2012 ad loc: ‘An unintended reference to T.’s being wounded is hard to 
avoid’. Servius: ‘dubie est locutus’.  
liv Abel (1967) 53; Degli’Innocenti Pierini 1997, 111, n.13. At Ep.12.9, Seneca uses Dido’s 
lament in Aen. 4.653 (uix et quam dederat cursum fortuna peregi) in an ambiguous and 
potentially ironic way to promote an acceptance of death, in the context of his portrait of 
perverse Pavucius, who like Petronius’ Trimalchio has his own burial performed daily: 
Papaioannou 2020, 123 suggests that both Dido and Pacuvius are negative foils in Ep.12, and 
we might speculate that similar connotations are operative in the evocation of Dido in ad 
Helu. 1. Cf. Mann 2006, Berno 2014. On citations of and allusions to Virgil in Senecan prose, 
cf. also Setaioli 1965, Mazzoli 1982, 215-32, André 1982, 219-33, Ker 2015. 
lv Trans. Costa 1994, 132. 
lvi Cf. Helvia, who has been ‘virtually given the right to indulge in tears excessively, though 
not endlessly’ (16.1). On Roman cultural expectations for mourning, which generally 
emphasize setting a limit (modus) to grief and define prolonged mourning or displays of 
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mourning as indulgent and unmanly/feminine, see Hope 2007, 173-210, Konstan 2006, 244-
58, cf. Sen. ad Marc. 7.3, Ep. 63.2, 63.12-13, Ep. 99. Notably, Seneca admits in Ep. 63.14 
that he himself should be included among examples of men who have been conquered by 
grief (quos dolor uincit). For the trope of limitless grief in Senecan tragedy see e.g. Ag. 691-2 
(non est lacrimis, Cassandra, modus, / quia quae patimur uicere modum). 
lvii Cf. Ovid, Met. 6.539-40 (Philomela): quin animam hanc, ne quod facinus tibi, perfide, 
restet, / eripis? 
lviii OLD s.v. dilectus 1.  
lix For this use of obducere see OLD s.v.6c, with Costa 1994, 208.  
lx E.g. sal… his [sc. uulneribus]… medicamentum est … exsaniat enim, Celsus 5.27.1B; 
Columella De re rust. 6.11.1; Galen De methodo medendi 5.307K. Cf. tunc et uruntur et in 
altum reuocantur, ad Marc. 1.8. On excising chronic wounds also cf. Ovid on Philoctetes 
(partem Poeantius heros / certa debuerat praesecuisse manu, Rem. 111-12).  
lxi The tendency of veteran soldiers to boast about their ‘virtuous’ wounds/scars is also 
mocked in Roman new comedy (the locus classicus is Terence Eun. 482-3, cf. Petronius 1.1). 
Discussion in Leigh 1995, Van Lommel 2015.  
lxii Galen De methodo medendi 3.160K, 6.384-385K (ulcers represent a dissolution of bodily 
unity). Wounds heal when flesh ‘fills’ the hole made by the wound, making the flesh whole 
again (e.g. Celsus 7.9.5: uulnus impleat).  
lxiii Cf. Sen. De Prov. 4.4 (militares uiri gloriantur uulneribus…), 4.7 (audacter ueteranus 
cruorem suum spectat); de Const. Sap. 16.2, 19.3, Ep.67.6, and the exemplum of Cato at de 
Tranq. 16.4, Ep.67.7, 67.13, 71.17, 95.72.  
lxiv OLD s.v. uiscera. Cf. Adams 1982, 95 and 116, with Ovid, Am. 2.14.27, Juvenal 9.43. 
lxv cf. omnis alia cupiditas intactum praeteribit, 13.3 (man to man).  
lxvi Cf. King 1998, 75-98, Loraux 1995, 111-15.  
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lxvii Cf. Salazar 2000, who reads wounds in literary texts as straightforward opportunities for 
soldiers to prove their valour and masculinity by the public toleration of pain, quoting ad 
Heluiam 3.1 as an example of the trope (2000, 223). For a more nuanced and ambivalent 
version of this argument in relation to Seneca, cf. Edwards 2000. Berkins-McCoy 2013 
pushes in the opposite direction, arguing (through Aristotle) that Greek thought often extols 
the recognition and acceptance of vulnerability. 
lxviii Degl’Innocenti Pierini 1997, 112-13.  
lxix At 78.15 Seneca quotes Aen. 1.203 (forsan et haec olim meminisse iuuabit).   
lxx uixque habet in nobis iam noua plaga locum (Ex P. 4.7.42); non habet in nobis iam noua 
plaga locum (Ex P. 4.16.52), with Rimell 2015, 286-7.  
lxxi Ovid’s Oedipal poetic offspring are parricides at Tr. 1.1.111-114. 
lxxii Cf. King 1998, 75-98, Loraux 1995, 111-15.  
lxxiii Discussion in Holmes 2007, 72-4. Cf. ad Helu. 18.8 (praecepta descendunt). 
lxxiv Cf. Rimell 2017.  
lxxv Pregnancy was thought to span ten lunar months: see Virgil, Ecl. 4.61 (matri longa decem 
tulerunt fastidia menses), cf. Prop. 2.3.28, Gell. 3.16. Elsewhere, Seneca reports that the 
maiores set a limit of one year on female mourning (Ep. 63.13). A Roman funerary law 
(FIRA 2, pp.334, 335) cited by Paulus (Opinions 1.21.2-5, 8-14: see Shelton 1988, 126) states 
that ‘parents and children over six years can be mourned for a year, children under six for a 
month. A husband can be mourned for ten months, close blood relations for eight months. 
Whoever acts contrary to these distinctions is placed in public disgrace’. Cf. Hope 2007, 173-
210, Konstan 2006, 244-58. 
lxxvi In line with the Stoic principle of not giving fixed decreta or praecepta, and of making 
ethical decisions based on precise circumstances. See Inwood 2005, 95-131.  
lxxvii Cf. Ep. 108.22, with Costa 1994, 216.  
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lxxviii OLD reuertor 4a.  
lxxix Cf. Ovid, Ex P. 1.7.47 (nec uitam ne copes nec ademit posse reuerti); Ex P. 3.5.57 (unde 
ego si fato nitor prohibente reuerti). Ker 2009, 98 emphasizes only the relation between 
father and son, suggesting that Seneca echoes voices from his father’s declamations (e.g. 
Contr. 2.7.9 on pudicitia, at ad Helu. 16.3), despite acknowledging what he calls ‘a gentle 
criticism of the father’.  
lxxx As Ker observes (2009, 98) Seneca here subtly reconfigures the preface to the second 
book of Seneca the Elder’s Controversiae: now he, rather than Mela, is promoted to a 
‘privileged position’ in that he is set apart from the other two brothers.  
lxxxi Cf. rapti uirgines, pueros (Sal. Cat. 51.9); iuuentus Romana ad rapiendas uirgines 
discurrit (Liv. 1.9.10); raptas…Sabinas (Virg. Aen. 8.635); Ganymeden…raptum (Cic. Tusc. 
1.65.7), rapti Ganymedis honores (Virg. Aen. 1.28), rapto Ganymede (Ov. Fasti 6.43) etc. 
lxxxii Degl’Innocenti Pierini 1997, 113 notes this vague allusion to Alcestis.  
lxxxiii Degl’Innocenti Pierini 1997, 117 with La Penna 1994. 
lxxxiv Degl’Innocenti Perini 1997, 117-119.  
lxxxv Foucault 1986, 52-3.  
lxxxvi Cf. Parker (2012). As Barthes put it (1975, 37), ‘The writer is someone who plays with 
his mother’s body’, whether to ‘glorify’ or ‘dismember’ it. 
lxxxvii I quote Butler 2004, 29.  
 
 
 
